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Understanding Deutsch’s Probability in a
Deterministic Multiverse
Hilary Greaves*
Abstract
Difficulties over probability have often been considered fatal to the
Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. Here I argue that the Ev-
erettian can have everything she needs from ‘probability’ without recourse
to indeterminism, ignorance, primitive identity over time or subjective un-
certainty: all she needs is a particular rationality principle.
The decision-theoretic approach recently developed by Deutsch and
Wallace claims to provide just such a principle. But, according to Wal-
lace, decision theory is itself applicable only if the correct attitude to a
future Everettian measurement outcome is subjective uncertainty. I ar-
gue that subjective uncertainty is not to be had, but I offer an alternative
interpretation that enables the Everettian to live without uncertainty: we
can justify Everettian decision theory on the basis that an Everettian
should care about all her future branches. The probabilities appearing in
the decision-theoretic representation theorem can then be interpreted as
the degrees to which the rational agent cares about each future branch.
This reinterpretation, however, reduces the intuitive plausibility of one of
the Deutsch-Wallace axioms (Measurement Neutrality).
Keywords: Everett interpretation; Probability; Decision theory
1 Introduction and overview
The quantum measurement problem is very simple: under the assumption that
our measurement apparatus is in principle describable by quantum mechanics,
the collapse postulate contradicts the unitary dynamics. The Everett solution
of the measurement problem is equally simple, on the face of it: discard the
collapse postulate. This is the ‘conservative’ solution, in the sense that it is the
only solution that retains the existing physics (quantum state and unitary evo-
lution) without amendment or addition. Such conservatism is surely desirable:
quite apart from the issue of elegance, the existing quantum dynamics has been
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overwhelmingly empirically successful, and the minute we change the dynamical
equations, we have no guarantee that results derived using the old equations will
still hold. Further, such dynamical supplements invariably spoil the relativistic
covariance of the theory; if we can successfully interpret the dynamics as it is,
covariance is guaranteed. We thus have a powerful prima facie motivation for
preferring the Everett interpretation. (Saunders (1997).)
But the Everett interpretation faces its own demons. How are we to under-
stand the worldview it gives us? In particular: (i) if it requires us to hold that
the world ‘splits’, what can determine that the ‘splitting’ will occur along the
lines prescribed by one basis in Hilbert space rather than another (the preferred
basis problem)? (ii) How can we make sense of personal identity over time in an
Everettian picture? (iii) Isn’t this all unacceptably ontologically extravagant?
(iv) Isn’t it in any case just plain unbelievable? (v) What about probability?
This paper is a discussion of (v), but first, cards must be laid on the table re-
garding (i)—(iv). In response to the preferred basis problem, in particular, there
is a growing tradition of attempting to flesh out the basic Everettian proposal
(Everett (1957)) by appeal to decoherence (e.g. Gell-Mann and Hartle (1990),
Saunders (1993, 1995), Wallace (2002a, 2003a), Zurek (1991, 1993, 1998)). Ac-
cording to this tradition, we should indeed consider that the world ‘splits’ when
a quantum measurement is performed: after the measurement, each possible
outcome will be realized in some branch of the ever-proliferating universe (‘mul-
tiverse’, if we prefer), and (Wallace (2002a)) each branch deserves to be called a
separate ‘world’. But, crucially, we are to understand this splitting as an effec-
tive and approximately defined process emergent from the quantum dynamics:
a ‘measurement’ is just a physical process in which a microscopic superposition
is magnified (under the unitary dynamics) up to a macroscopic scale, and a
‘split’ is just the advent of a suitable large-scale superposition. It is decoher-
ence, rather than any primitive ‘global bifurcation of spacetime’ (pace Earman
1986, p.224), that prevents parallel branches from subsequently interfering with
one another. No heavy metaphysics, and no multiplication of mass-energy (pace
Healey (1984)), is to be introduced.1
The spirit of the decoherence approach to the preferred basis problem,
1The decoherence approach is to be contrasted with a ‘further fact’ many-worlds inter-
pretation. According to the latter, the dynamics is explicitly supplemented by interpretive
postulates that specify by fiat which parts of the wavefunction correspond to distinct worlds;
two proposals that agreed on the universal state but disagreed on the delineation of worlds
would then be individually coherent, but mutually incompatible, proposals. It is in fact
difficult to find proponents of the Everett interpretation who advocate a further fact inter-
pretation — Deutsch (1985) is an exception, although Deutsch himself no longer holds the
view expressed in that paper. A further fact view is often attributed to DeWitt (1970), but
I can find nothing in his writings to generate any tension with (instead) a decoherence-based
understanding of ‘splitting’. However this may be, the further fact MWI is pedagogically
useful, not least because it is the understanding of Everett that seems to be envisaged by
several critics of ‘the’ MWI (e.g. Kent (1990), Albert and Loewer (1988), Lewis (2004)).
Hereinafter, I will sometimes refer to the interpretation in question as ‘Everett’. This is
simply an abbreviation; I will always be referring to the the decoherence-based picture sketched
above rather than to the person, and at no point do I intend to make any historical claim
regarding Everett’s original (1957) ideas.
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clearly, is that everything supervenes on the existing physics. As such, it goes
naturally hand-in-hand with particular responses to the next two of the chal-
lenges listed above. We are to adopt a reductionist approach to personal iden-
tity over time and a fairly strong supervenience of the mental on the physical:
once the physics has been specified, there is no further matter of which post-
measurement observer will beme, and we are simply to choose a best description
(here we part company with ‘many-minds’ approaches, e.g. Albert and Loewer
(1988)).
The next two challenges are relatively easy to dispose of. To the charge of
ontological extravagance it can be countered that, firstly, such ‘extravagance’ is
preferable to the theoretical extravagance and inelegance required to eliminate
other branches when our best formalism predicts their existence; secondly, this
ontological extravagance is anyway not too damaging when the extra entities
are of the same kind as those already admitted to existence. Complaints that
the Everettian picture is simply unbelievable may be well taken, but as far
as philosophy goes, we can reply only by borrowing David Lewis’s memorable
remark: “I cannot refute an incredulous stare.”
So far so good, perhaps. But even if the Everettian can get this far (which
remains an open question — see, e.g., Zurek (2003) for a recent review of the
state of play vis-a`-vis the preferred basis problem), she will still face a problem
over the issue of probability — what story is to be told about the relationship
between the probabilistic statements of instrumentalist QM, and the Everettian
worldview? This is the topic of the remainder of this paper; from here on, I
make the working assumption that the decoherence-based approach is, at least
otherwise, sound.
We can begin by distinguishing two aspects of the probability problem. The
first is the incoherence problem. Everettian quantum mechanics appears to be a
straightforwardly deterministic theory — there is, in Everett, no necessary igno-
rance of initial conditions (in contrast to the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory
— see, e.g., Bohm (1952)), and no irreducibly stochastic collapse (in contrast to
state-reduction theories — see, e.g., GRW (1986), Pearle (1989)). Instead, we
can be certain that each possible outcome of a quantum measurement is realized
in some post-measurement branch. In that case, can it even make sense to talk
of probability?
The second is the quantitative problem, which remains even if the incoherence
problem can be solved: can Everett recover probabilities that numerically agree
with those of the Born rule? The quantitative problem is perhaps unproblematic
in the case of equally weighted superpositions, but has been considered fatal in
the case of unequally weighted superpositions. The reason for the latter is that
when a superposition is unequally-weighted, the instrumentalist QM algorithm
would assign unequal probabilities to the various outcomes. In contrast, it seems
that all Everett can say is that each outcome occurs in exactly one branch2,
which, we might think, will yield equal probabilities if any at all.
2Actually, it is overly na¨ıve to suppose that the Everettian can strictly even say this: the
‘number of branches’, on a decoherence-based approach to splitting, will not be well-defined.
This will be important later — see section 5.3.
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Now, one might think that any would-be interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics is utterly constrained to recover probability properly so-called (whatever that
may mean), simply in order to deserve the name. In that case the challenge to
Everett would seem to be a straightforward ultimatum: probability or die. But
we should be more careful than this. Any theory that recovers the virtues of
QM (or equivalent virtues) while avoiding its vices is acceptable; if it deserves
the title ‘replacement for’ rather than ‘interpretation of’ quantum mechanics,
so be it.
According to the view I will advocate (section 2), what is required, in or-
der to render the Everett interpretation acceptable, is a particular rationality
principle: the Everettian must be advised to care about her future branches
in proportion to their relative quantum amplitude-squared measures. Such a
principle will do two things for the Everettian: it will tell her how to act in the
face of the otherwise daunting picture of branching personal identity that Ev-
erett gives us, and, on a plausible (albeit not self-evident) account of empirical
confirmation, it will allow her to regard quantum mechanics (understood in her
Everettian way) as an empirically confirmed theory. If we think that proba-
bility is defined by its role in prescribing rational action, then this amounts to
recovering ‘probability’; under other construals of ‘probability’ it may not; but
that question is merely terminological.
In that case the decision-theoretic approach of Deutsch (1999) and Wallace
(2002b/2003b) is precisely called for; in section 3 I give a brief overview of the
decision-theoretic programme and its application to the Everett interpretation.
Deutsch, and Wallace following him, invokes decision theory in an attempt to
prove that a rational Everettian should act ‘as if’ the Born probability rule were
true. If this proof is sound, and if (in addition) my arguments of section 2 are
correct, then the problem of probability in the Everett interpretation has been
solved.
Sections 4 and 5 offer critical discussion of the decision-theoretic approach.
Section 4 addresses the question of whether decision theory is even applicable
to the Everettian branching scenario. We might think not: according to Wal-
lace, for instance, the intuitive and conceptual acceptability of the proof rests
upon the premise that a rational Everettian facing an imminent measurement,
despite knowing all the relevant facts concerning her situation (that she will
split, etc.), should regard her situation as one of subjective uncertainty (SU). In
section 4.1 I argue that this premise is false. I claim, instead, that (given our
reductionist approach to personal identity over time) the rational Everettian
should feel that she knows exactly what is going to happen, including what
is going to happen to her. In that case, one might think that decision theory
is inapplicable to Everettian branching — decision theory is, after all, a the-
ory designed for decision-making under uncertainty — and thus that Deutsch’s
approach is misguided; one might further think that, ‘proved’ or not, the ratio-
nality principle itself just doesn’t make sense in an Everettian context. I argue
against each of these suspicions. I claim (section 4.3) that we can understand
the reasonableness of the decision-theoretic rationality constraints on the basis
of the fact that the rational Everettian agent should care about all of her futures;
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the ‘probabilities’ appearing in Deutsch’s decision theory are then understood
as measures of the degree to which the present person-stage cares about each
future branch. In this respect, the decision-theoretic program is not damaged
by the abandonment of the ‘subjective uncertainty’ claim.
In section 5 I turn to a more contentious aspect of Deutsch’s proof. Deutsch
must assume, in addition to decision theory, an axiom that Wallace christens
‘Measurement Neutrality’ (MN): that the rational agent is indifferent between
any two quantum ‘bets’ (or ‘acts’ or ‘games’; see section 3.2) that involve mea-
suring the same observable Xˆ on the same state |ψ〉, and assigning the same
reward as each other to each observed eigenvalue, but disagree on how Xˆ is to be
measured on |ψ〉. That this (originally tacit) assumption is crucial to Deutsch’s
proof, and that it is more contentious than a first glance suggests, was pointed
out by Wallace (2002b/2003b). But Wallace suggests that the prospects for
giving MN a strong intuitive justification are good. I will argue that while this
may be true under a sufficiently strong SU philosophy, the prospects look bleak
if, as I urge, we abandon SU.
This is not to say that the probability problem is insoluble, and hence the
Everett interpretation sunk. Neither is that my position: in section 5.4 I argue
that in fact, we should accept as something of a primitive that rational action
for an Everettian involves acting ‘as if’ the Born rule is true. This move, how-
ever, leaves the decision-theoretic program playing a somewhat different role
from that originally intended by Deutsch: rather than persuading a would-be
dissenter of the truth of the Born rule, the decision-theoretic program serves as
an illustration of the internal coherence of such primitive acceptance.
Section 6 summarizes the paper’s conclusions. The demand for ‘probability’
in any more exalted sense than that of decision theory is (with one important
proviso) misguided. There is no conceptual obstacle to applying decision theory
to Everettian branching: the very same reasons that urge a non-branching agent
to care about her unique future urge an Everettian to care about all her futures,
and this is enough. We need not and should not invoke uncertainty. But without
uncertainty, Deutsch and Wallace’s assumption of ‘Measurement Neutrality’
is unjustifiable; the Everettian is thus driven to a more primitive acceptance
of the Born rule. This, however, is not much of an objection to the Everett
interpretation.
2 The problem of probability
Discussions of the problem of probability in Everett usually begin from the
tacit assumption that if Everett cannot sustain the probabilistic statements of
‘standard’ QM, Everett must be rejected. The issues will be clearer if we start
from one step further back: what, precisely, is the rationale for such conditional
rejection?
It is instructive to consider which features of Everett would survive the loss
of a probability interpretation. We are given a picture of an ever-branching uni-
verse, initially factorizable joint states of composite observer-object-environment
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systems evolving into entangled states. In those entangled states, each super-
posed component of the state of the joint system, in the decoherence-preferred
basis, describes something that looks like (and indeed is) an approximately
classical world; after a measurement, each branch describes a post-measurement
state corresponding to one particular definite measurement outcome. This much
will survive. So also will the consistency of the Everettian story with experi-
ment. We have not observed probabilities, we have observed relative frequencies,
and these are reproduced by Everett: the Everett interpretation predicts that
there will exist a branch with precisely the sequence of outcomes, and a fortiori
the relative frequencies, that we have in fact observed. (Everett also, of course,
predictes that there will be branches collectively representing every other ‘pos-
sible’ set of relative frequencies. I do not deny that herein lies a problem: see
section 2.2. My point here is just that the problem is not inconsistency with
experiment.)
What of the quantum-mechanical amplitudes? Each component of the de-
composition is associated with a complex number ci such that 0 ≤ |ci| ≤ 1, but,
we are supposing, the |ci|2 are not interpretable in terms of probability. The ci
do have physical (non-probabilistic) consequences in cases of interference, but
we neglect the possibility of interference between macroscopic branches.3 In
that case, all that can be said of the future relative to the pre-measurement
observer’s world is the following: all and only those outcomes that correspond
to an eigenstate that has nonzero amplitude in the pre-measurement state of the
microsystem will be realized, and thence observed, in some post-measurement
branch. It is statements like these that are the core empirical predictions of
collapse-free, probability-free quantum mechanics; is this good enough? I will
argue that it is not, but we need to be clear as to why (exactly!) such an
impoverished interpretation of no-collapse quantum mechanics is inadequate.
2.1 What should I do?
On a purely pragmatic level, in the first instance, the recent convert to the
Everett interpretation is faced with a bewildering dilemma - how is he rationally
to act, believing that he has more than one future self? Dilemmas such as
this have been considered in a (mostly) hypothetical tone in the philosophical
literature (e.g. Parfit (1984)). One response (e.g., Wilkes (1988)) suggests that
the scenario is technologically impossible, and that therefore we need not have
an answer. However this may be in the classical case, such a comfortable reply is
3One might try to justify this move by claiming (with support from the theory of de-
coherence) that macroscopic inter-branch interference is highly ‘improbable’ relative to any
plausible ignorance probability distribution over the set of initial states of the universe; in
that way we would have ‘improbability’ in the sense required for current purposes without
interpreting the amplitudes in terms of probability. But actually, it is questionable whether
this move is valid - it may be that interference is common between macroscopic branches
of extremely low amplitude (thanks to David Wallace for pointing this out). If that is the
case, we have a further need for something like probability, to justify neglecting branches of
low amplitude, and hence to underwrite a decoherence-based solution to the preferred basis
problem.
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not available to the Everettian — far from being impossible, he believes, fission
is inevitable!
This is an unavoidable philosophical problem for an Everettian. We are ac-
customed to believing that future quantum measurement outcomes have (what-
ever exactly this may mean) objective probabilities of actually occurring, and
that in deciding on courses of action, we should (for whatever reason) weight
our expectations according to those probabilities. (A toy situation in which this
issue is urgent is discussed in section 4.3.) If the amplitude-squared measure in
the Everett interpretation does not bear a similar link to rational action, there-
fore, the ‘rational’ foundation that the recent convert is accustomed to using to
guide his behavior is kicked away, and a replacement guide, one that delivers
the same advice or otherwise, is urgently required — inaction is impossible.
2.2 Inadequate justification for believing Everett
If a theory fails to be empirically coherent, it might be true, but if
true, then one could never have empirical reason for accepting it as
true. (Barrett (1999), pp.116-7)
The issue of confirmation in Everettian quantum mechanics4 is a tricky one.
On the one hand, quantum mechanics, when understood along Everettian lines,
makes very strong predictions. It is, after all, a deterministic theory. Given
the state of the universe at any one time, an Everettian Laplace’s Demon could
tell us, in principle, exactly what will happen: which branches will exist and
just what each will be like. From a God’s-eye view, then, Everett is eminently
falsifiable. The problem is that Everettian QM also predicts that any individual
observer at any given time (or community of interacting observers) will have a
severely limited access to the multiverse. Each can interact with, and hence can
observe, only the inhabitants of his (their) own branch; each can have interacted
with, and hence can have memories or records of, only inhabitants of his (their)
own branch’s history. As far as predictions for individual branches go, therefore,
Everett’s predictions are, until and unless we have some interpretation of the
branch amplitudes, not all that much more than ‘anything is possible’. How
can we have empirical reason to believe a theory that just says that anything is
possible?
Here the similarity to indeterministic theories is striking. So let us consider
how we treat confirmation in those theories: say, quantum mechanics under
4I am not referring to the issue of the empirical confirmation of Everett as opposed to rival
interpretations of quantum mechanics. There are plenty of reasons for preferring the Ev-
erett interpretation over rivals on theoretical rather than empirical grounds (aesthetic appeal,
economy on assumptions, prospects for relativistic covariance, and so on). Further, we can
in fact find differences in empirical predictions between rival ‘interpretations’, if we look hard
enough (for instance, the Everett interpretation permits macroscopic interference phenomena
that would be forbidden by the GRW theory). Rather, the worry is this: it may be that
if, attracted (say) by such theoretical virtues, we decide to understand quantum mechanics
along Everettian lines, suddenly we lose the empirical reason we had for believing quantum
mechanics in the first place.
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an instrumentalist collapse interpretation. Again, we can never regard such a
theory as absolutely empirically refuted, as long as what we observe to happen is
something that the theory deemed possible. What we do in this indeterministic
case, of course, is to adopt a probabilistic criterion of confirmation: we regard
the theory as empirically confirmed iff the results we observe are ones that (or,
ones that belong to a suitable class that) the theory would have told us to expect
with high probability.
This, then, is the second reason why the Everett interpretation requires a
probability interpretation or something very similar : without one, the Everett
interpretation is in the predicament Barrett (quoted above) laments (although
not for the reason Barrett gives in his book). Such a theory could be true — it
is neither incoherent nor inconsistent with the experimental evidence — but if
true we could have no justification for believing it.
2.3 Linking and solving the two problems
At first sight, it seems that the two genuine probability-related problems I have
outlined above are rather different: on the one hand, we ask how we (rationally)
should act, given the assumed truth of Everettian QM; on the other, we ask
whether we (rationally) should believe Everettian QM in the first place.
Against this, I propose that the following, if true, will suffice to kill both
of the above problems with one stone: the rational Everettian cares about her
future successors in proportion to their relative amplitude-squared measures.
It is easy to see that this is relevant to the first problem, i.e. the problem of
how rationally to act when facing the prospect of a branching future. If I know
how to weight the interests of my successors one against the other, then I can
calculate which course of action will best serve my overall interest. (These ideas
are made precise by the machinery of decision theory, for which see section 3.)
On the face of it, it is far less easy to see that such a ‘caring measure’ would
have anything to do with empirical confirmation of theories. Nevertheless, I
think a fairly strong case can be made for the following philosophical conjecture:
If the rational Everettian cares about her future successors in propor-
tion to their relative amplitude-squared measures, then (given our
actual experimental data) she should regard (Everettian) quantum
mechanics as empirically confirmed.
Why is this conjecture at all plausible? Well, consider (for instance) the
Bayesian account of empirical confirmation. According to Bayesians, the ratio-
nal agent updates his credence in a theory by Conditionalization:
pAnew(T ) = pold(T/A) ≡
pold(A/T )
pold(A)
pold(T )
where
• T is the proposition that a certain theory (for instance, quantum mechan-
ics) is true,
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• A is some proposition in which we might come to have degree of belief 1
(for instance, that the dial swung to point at ‘spin-up’),
• pold(·) is the agent’s credence function before obtaining information as to
the truth of A, and
• pAnew(·) is the agent’s credence function after coming to have degree of
belief 1 in A.
Why Conditionalize? Bayesians have a variety of responses to this challenge.
One is a diachronic ‘Dutch Book’ argument (e.g. Teller 1973): it can be shown
that, if the agent updates his degrees of belief in any nontrivial way on learning
that A, and if his updating is other than by Conditionalization, then a ‘Dutch
book’ can be made against him. That is, one can devise a series of bets — all of
which the agent is committed to accepting (according to his announced degrees
of belief at the time the bet is offered) — such that the agent is guaranteed to
make a net loss, no matter what the truth-values of the relevant propositions.
How? Such a Dutch Book involves three bets. The first bet (which will be
our primary concern here) is offered before the truth of A is known: the agent is
required to bet that A is true, using his current degree of belief in A as betting
quotient. The truth or falsity of A is then ascertained, the agent updates his
beliefs according to his chosen policy, and two further bets are offered using the
agent’s new betting quotients. Gains and losses from the three bets are summed
to give the net result.
My point is that a precisely analogous Dutch Book argument supports up-
dating one’s credence in a theory by Conditionalization in the deterministic
branching case. The fundamental assumption underpinning Dutch Book argu-
ments is that betting quotients should equal degrees of belief. (Indeed, this
is often regarded as definitive of degrees of belief.) So, in the stochastic case,
the agent’s degree of belief in A serves as his betting quotient for A: it is this
that commits him to accepting the first bet. But in the deterministic branching
case, surely, the agent’s caring measure over his future branches plays exactly
the same role in determining betting quotients. In the branching scenario, the
agent knows that he has two real future branches, on one of which A occurs (and
which he cares about to degree p), and on the other of which ¬A occurs (and
which he cares about to degree (1− p)). Accepting a bet (pre-measurement) on
the truth of A will commit one successor to a certain gain, and another succes-
sor to a certain loss. There will be some betting quotient such that our agent
is indifferent between accepting this bet and rejecting it: I claim that that bet-
ting quotient is p. (Again, we might well regard this as definitive of the caring
measure.) Therefore, if the agent, on observing A or ¬A, updates his credence
in the theory nontrivially but other than by Conditionalization, then one can
offer a series of bets which he will accept but which guarantee him a net loss on
every branch. This is just as bad as being guaranteed a net loss no matter what
the outcome: what happens to successors on those future branches constitutes
our agent’s future. The branching agent, therefore, should Conditionalize for
the same reason that the agent in a stochastic world should Conditionalize.
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If we accept this argument, the problem for Everett is then in focus. Con-
sider the degree to which, had I believed Everett before I heard the results of
any quantum-mechanical experiments, it would not have been rational for me
act as if I had a single successor and to regard a class of data of which the actual
data are typical as highly probable. To that same degree, it is not rational to
believe Everettian quantum mechanics.
There is plenty more to be said in justification, and in criticism, of my
conjecture; I do not pretend to have provided a conclusive defense of it. (In
particular, it is worrying that the Dutch Book argument has nothing to say
against an agent who insists that the observation of A or ¬A is irrelevant to
his belief in the theory, and hence that he will retain his old degrees of belief:
pAnew(·) = pold(·).) The relevance of the remainder of this paper to the second
problem (i.e. to the issue of whether we should believe Everettian quantum
mechanics) is conditional on the truth of this conjecture that a ‘caring measure’
would play the same role as stochastic chance in theory confirmation. (One more
supportive comment, though: we have no alternative account of what it would
take to empirically confirm a deterministic branching theory, and to say that
there is no way to confirm any such theory would be — I think — suspicious.)
It is crucial to note that if my above arguments as to what is and what is not
problematic about the issue of probability in Everett are correct, the incoherence
problem is transformed, as follows. If it is really an indispensable criterion for
applicability of the term ‘probability’ that (say) one outcome must occur to the
exclusion of the others, or that probability measures uncertainty, then perhaps
there is no probability in Everett, but this cannot in itself generate a problem.
In fact, I share Deutsch’s view that the defining feature of ‘probability’ is its
role in prescribing rational action: in other words, if some given feature of
reality plays the role that probability plays in rationality, then that feature of
reality thereby deserves the name ‘probability’. I will therefore join standard
practice in using the term ‘probability’ within the decision-theoretic programme
(below). But any reader sceptical of this view of ‘probability’ should note that
the disagreement is a purely verbal one: if my above conjecture is correct, then
the genuine problems in Everett arise from the need for a rationality principle,
with or without title to the name ‘probability’.
We would have an ‘incoherence problem’ if we could not defend such a ra-
tionality principle. For instance, it could turn out that there were no coherent
strategy for rational action in an Everettian context. In that case, according to
my sections 2.1 and 2.2, Everett would be not only (a) useless in guiding our
actions, but also (b) impossible to empirically confirm, due to ‘probability not
making sense’. As Deutsch notes, this possibility cannot be ruled out of court:
It is not self-evident . . . that rationality is possible at all, in the
presence of quantum-mechanical processes — or, for that matter,
in the presence of electromagnetic or any other processes. (Deutsch
(1999), p.3130)
Further, we would have a problem if it should turn out that Everettian ratio-
nality, while possible, does not underwrite any representation theorem that uses
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a probability function (see section 3). This, though, is rather different to the
‘incoherence problem’ that much previous work on the topic has been concerned
with (e.g. Albert and Loewer (1988), Loewer (1996), Saunders (1998), Wallace
(2002b/2003b), Ismael (2003)).
3 The decision-theoretic programme
In the light of the above, the line pursued by Deutsch (1999) and Wallace
(2002b/2003b), namely to address probability concerns in Everett by means of
decision theory, is precisely the right approach — the two genuine problems,
that of justifying belief in Everett and the practical question of what to do if
we do hold such belief, come down to the single issue of rational action in the
face of an imminent measurement given the truth of Everett, and it is this issue
that the decision-theoretic programme addresses.
In section 3.1 I summarize the basic ideas behind decision theory as treated
by Savage (1972). (See Joyce (1999) for a more extended exposition, and Fish-
burn (1981) for a thorough review of Savage’s approach and alternatives.) In
section 3.2 I give an informal sketch of Deutsch’s proof that the ‘rational’ Ev-
erettian agent is constrained to adopt the Born rule. (Here also, my account will
be no more than a sketch; for the details, see Deutsch’s original paper and/or
Wallace’s exegesis and extension.) I postpone criticism until sections 4 and 5.
3.1 Savage decision theory
Decision theory, as usually conceived, is a theory of rational action in the face of
uncertainty: it provides a framework in which we can discuss an agent’s choices
of actions, provided that those choices satisfy certain intuitively reasonable con-
straints which we are prepared to regard as criteria of rationality. We begin by
carving up the agent’s decision problem by means of the following sets:
• A set C of Consequences. Under the intended interpretation, this set is
the locus of value to the agent : some Consequences are better for the
agent than others. Typical Consequences might be winning the London
Marathon, receiving $10, or contracting pneumonia.
• A set S of States of the world. Under the intended interpretation, this set
is the locus of the agent’s uncertainty: the agent is uncertain as to which
State S ∈ S “obtains”. We then define the set E of Events as the power
set of S. Typical examples of either States or Events (there is flexibility
as to just how fine-grained the individual States are to be) might be a
certain egg’s being rotten, or its raining tomorrow.
The sets C and S are taken as basic primitives, and interpreted as indicated
by the examples given. We form the set CS of functions from S into C, and
define:
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• A set A ⊆ CS of Acts. These are to be interpreted as courses of action
that an individual might make. The mathematical representation of and
Act is by means of a function from States to Consequences because the
agent is supposed to know which Consequence will result from each of
the Acts between which he is choosing, given any State S ∈ S. (If the
agent does not have such complete knowledge of Consequences, this means
only that we have carved up the decision problem incorrectly — see Joyce
(1999), pp.52-3.) Typical Acts might be crossing to road, playing a game
of tennis, or purchasing a $10 bet on Blue Murder at 16:1 odds.
• A weak preference relation  ⊆ A ×A, with the intended interpretation
that for all Acts A,B ∈ A, A  B iff the agent prefers Act A to Act B or
is indifferent between A and B.
Following Wallace (2002b), we add a set of Chance Setups, enabling the
theory to deal with the fact that the set of future States of the world is in
general dependent on the agent’s choice of Act:
A set M of Chance Setups, to be regarded as situations in which
a number of possible events might occur, and where it is in general
impossible to predict with certainty which will occur. Examples
might be a rolled die (in which case there is uncertainty as to which
face will be uppermost) or a section of road over a five-minute period
(in which case there is uncertainty as to whether or not a bus will
come along).
For each M ∈ M we define a subset SM ⊆ S of States which might
occur as a consequence of the Chance Setup. (The Event space [EM ]
for M is . . . the power set of SM .) (Wallace (2002b), p.5; capitaliza-
tion added)
Decision theory then defines probability in terms of the agent’s preferences,
as follows. We consider an agent faced with a choice of constant Acts, i.e. Acts
that assign the same Consequence to every possible State s ∈ SM . We say that
if, for two such Acts c1, c2, a rational agent weakly prefers c1 to c2 (i.e. c1  c2),
then for arbitrary events Ea, Eb, that agent’s probability for Ea is higher than
or equal to his probability for Eb iff the agent weakly prefers the deal (c1 if Ea
occurs and c2 if Eb occurs) to (c2 if Ea occurs and c1 if Eb occurs).
So far, of course, we have at best only a qualitative notion of probability,
and in fact no guarantee that the ‘higher than’ relation we have defined is an
ordering. To gain such a guarantee and to proceed to a quantitative definition,
we require that the agent’s preferences among Acts satisfy certain intuitively
highly reasonable axioms: that the preferences be transitive (if an Act A is
weakly preferred to B and B is weakly preferred to C, then A is weakly preferred
to C), that they satisfy Dominance (if an Act A gives Consequences that are
weakly preferred to those given by Act B on every possible State, then Act A
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is weakly preferred to Act B), and so forth.5
From these axioms, we prove a representation theorem: that the agent’s
preferences among Acts determine (e.g. Savage (1972)) a unique quantitative
‘probability’ measure PrM : EM → [0, 1] and (von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947); their axioms follow from Savage’s) a value function V : C → ℜ, unique
up to a multiplicative and an additive constant, such that the preferences are
completely represented by the following rule.
Expected Utility rule. For all A,B ∈ A, Act A is preferred to Act B iff
EU(A) > EU(B), where the expected utility EU : A → ℜ is given by
∀F ∈ A, EU(F ) =
∑
x∈SM
PrM (x)V(f(x)). (1)
Again: depending on one’s philosophy of probability, one may or may not
judge that the measure PrM really deserves the name ‘probability’, but for
present purposes this should be regarded as a verbal matter.
3.2 The Deutsch-Wallace quantum representation theo-
rem
The decision-theoretic approach is then applied to Everettian quantum me-
chanics. We consider a pre-measurement observer who is faced with a choice of
decision-theoretic Acts (or ‘games ’) involving quantum measurements. (‘Mea-
surement’ is to be understood in the Everettian sense, i.e. as a process in which
a microscopic system, perhaps in a state of superposition, becomes appropri-
ately entangled with the state of (some macroscopic part of) the rest of the
universe.) Each Act involves the agent agreeing to stake the fates of his future
selves on the outcome of such a measurement, where the specification of the
Act includes that of a particular state |ψ〉 to be measured, observable Xˆ to be
measured on that state, and payoff function P from observed eigenvalues to
Consequences. We consider the agent’s preferences among possible Acts, and
require (in order that he be counted as rational) that those preferences satisfy
the following constraints:
(i) very close analogues of some set of conventional decision-theoretic axioms;
(ii) Physicality (P): the agent’s preferences ultimately attach to physical
scenarios rather than to mathematical objects, so that if two mathematical
objects G1 = 〈|ψ1〉, Xˆ1,P1〉, G2 = 〈|ψ2〉, Xˆ2,P2〉 represent the same physical
scenario, the agent is indifferent between G1 and G2;
5The decision-theoretic axioms are far from uncontroversial within discussions of decision
theory itself, and there is more than one possible set of axioms that one could use. I will
refrain from further discussing the specifics: we can regard any serious candidate set of axioms
as uncontentious for present purposes. Further, the choice is not crucial to the quantum
project: Wallace (2002b) gives several variant proofs of the quantum representation theorem
(see section 3.2), from rival sets of axioms.
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(iii) Measurement neutrality (MN): the agent is indifferent between two Acts
that agree on |ψ〉, Xˆ and P but disagree on how Xˆ is measured on |ψ〉.6
It can then be proved (Deutsch (1999), Wallace (2002b/2003b)) that for an
agent to be ‘rational’ in the sense of these axioms, he is constrained to adopt
the amplitude-squared measure as his probability function.
In outline, Deutsch’s original proof proceeds as follows. (See Wallace (2002b),
pp.38-41, or (2003b), pp.14-17, for a more detailed reconstruction, with those
of the above assumptions that were tacit in Deutsch’s work made explicit.)
First, we consider an equally-weighted two-component superposition |ψ〉 =
1√
2
(|x1〉 + |x2〉). We consider a game (Act) in which an observable Xˆ whose
spectrum includes x1 and x2 is to be measured on |ψ〉, and in which the suc-
cessor who observes the result x1 (x2 resp.) will be awarded a Consequence
c1 (c2 resp.); we ask how much the agent values this game. (‘Value’ is also to
be understood in the decision-theoretic sense defined above — recall that the
point of a value function is to plug into the expected utility rule, and thus to
encode the agent’s preferences between Acts. Heuristically, as Deutsch notes,
we can understand the value of a quantum game to be the greatest amount of
money our rational agent would be willing to pay for the privilege of playing
the game.) Using considerations of symmetry (which do not, however, invoke
any assumptions over and above those listed above), it is proved that the value
of this game must equal the average of the values of the two Consequences
(Deutsch’s equation (2.10)/Wallace’s Stage 1):
V( 1√
2
(|x1〉+ |x2〉)) = 1
2
(V(c1) + V(c2)). (2)
Therefore, the agent must assign decision-theoretic probability 1
2
to each mea-
surement outcome. It is then straightforward to extend this result to an n-
component equal-amplitude superposition for arbitrary n (Deutsch’s equation
(3.1)/Wallace’s Stage 2):
V( 1√
n
(|x1〉+ . . .+ |xn〉)) = 1
n
(V(c1) + . . .+ V(cn)). (3)
Second, we consider unequally-weighted superpositions. Here Deutsch’s strat-
egy is to show that, on the Everettian understanding of ‘measurement’, a mea-
surement of an observable on an unequally-weighted superposition can be real-
ized by a physical process that also meets the definition of a measurement of
another observable, Yˆ say, on a system that is in an equally-weighted superpo-
sition of eigenstates of Yˆ . It then follows, from the fact that all eigenvalues of
Yˆ are to be considered equally probable (are to be assigned equal importance in
the agent’s calculation of the decision-theoretic value of the game), that distinct
eigenvalues of Xˆ cannot be assigned equal probability, and that if consistency
6Physicality and Measurement Neutrality are not made explicit in Deutsch’s original paper,
but, as Wallace points out, they are nontrivial (in the case of Physicality: not entirely trivial)
and essential to the proof. See section 5 for discussion of the acceptability of Measurement
Neutrality.
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is to be had, their probabilities must in fact be assigned according to the Born
rule (but see section 5). For example, for integer m, n in the first instance,
Deutsch can show that (his equation (3.5)/Wallace’s Stage 3)
V(
√
m
n
|x1〉+
√
n−m
n
|x2〉) = mV(c1) + (n−m)V(c2)
n
, (4)
and it is then fairly straightforward to generalise this result (Wallace’s Stages 4
through 6) to the case of irrational coefficients and superpositions of arbitrary
numbers of components, thus proving the Born rule. (See section 5.2 for more
detailed discussion of this argument concerning unequal superpositions.)
Given this result, we see that ‘rationality’ in the sense of our axioms re-
quires that the probability function appearing in the expected-utility rule must
be the quantum amplitude-squared measure. This is a remarkably strong result.
In the standard case, Savage (1972) proved that the agent’s preferences deter-
mine a unique probability function (and an effectively unique value measure).
However, there is substantial freedom over preferences within the bounds of
rationality, and subsequently, in that case, substantial elbow room for rational
agents to disagree over probability measures. (You and I can harbour very dif-
ferent subjective probabilities for rain tomorrow, even given the same evidence,
without either of us being deemed irrational.) In the Everettian case, Deutsch
and Wallace have proved that an agent is constrained to adopt precisely the
amplitude-squared probabilities for action, given only that his preferences sat-
isfy their constraining ‘rationality axioms’: a set of decision-theoretic axioms,
Physicality and Measurement Neutrality. (The agent’s value function on Con-
sequences, of course, suffers no such a priori restriction. The agent remains free
to enjoy dancing in the rain.) The very strength of this result is likely to raise
suspicion: just how can an agent whose preferences (say) disrespect amplitudes
be branded ‘irrational’? I will argue later (section 5) that this suspicion is well
founded: it turns out that necessarily, such an agent violates Measurement Neu-
trality, but the intuitive justification for that axiom as a rationality axiom is not
at all solid. First, though, I turn to a more sweeping worry, one that challenges
the very coherence of the decision-theoretic approach: a worry as to whether
decision theory is applicable to an Everettian measurement at all.
4 Problem: applicability of decision theory
A prima facie problem with the decision-theoretic approach, as Wallace notes,
is the following: since the relevant parts of decision theory are designed to deal
with decision-making under uncertainty, how can decision theory coherently be
applied if determinism is the full Everettian story?
To see the problem, consider again the standard decision-theoretic frame-
work (section 3.1): States, Consequences, Acts and Chance Setups. The point
is that in a situation with no uncertainty, it seems that much of this framework
cannot apply. The set of States was supposed to be the locus of uncertainty; the
idea of a Chance Setup was that the agent was supposed to be uncertain as to
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which State actually obtained; then the achievement of decision theory was to
represent coherent preferences between Acts by means of a probability function
that measures the agent’s uncertainty (and a value function on Consequences).
If (classically) our agent knows the State of the world, it seems that all we can
say to constrain his preferences is that they must define an ordering on Conse-
quences. If that is true, then there is no point in defining an Act as a function
from States to Consequences: we need only deal with one State (namely, the
actual one). In particular, decision theory thus impoverished will have no non-
trivial concept of probability: insofar as it deals in probability at all, it merely
says that the actual State has probability 1, while all others have probability
zero. It thus seems that even if we accept that ‘probability’, at least for current
purposes, is defined by its role in rational action — so, we accept that if we
advocated a strategy for rational action employing a certain quantity in the role
of probability, that quantity would count as probability, no matter that it did
not measure uncertainty — still we cannot have (nontrivial) probability without
uncertainty in Everett.
There are three lines of response to this problem. The first (Wallace’s pre-
ferred response) is the subjective uncertainty (SU) interpretation, which claims
that although the Everett interpretation is objectively a deterministic theory,
an observer who believes Everett and is about to observe a QM measurement
is nevertheless in a position of subjective uncertainty. The second is the Reflec-
tion argument - since a post-measurement observer who has not yet inspected
her apparatus is in a position of genuine (self-locating) uncertainty and could be
required to announce her betting quotient for the measurement outcome, a prin-
ciple of reflection justifies applying decision theory to the pre-measurement ob-
server. The third (my preferred response) is a fission-based interpretation. This
latter denies that uncertainty is a crucial component of the decision-theoretic ap-
proach at all, and applies decision theory on the basis that the pre-measurement
observer cares about each of her future selves.
In section 4.1, I argue that the subjective uncertainty argument fails —
that the result of an Everettian measurement, given the pure initial state, is
(subjectively as well as objectively) certain. The Reflection argument (sec-
tion 4.2) suffers no such fatal flaw, but I will argue that, in comparison with
the fission-based interpretation (section 4.3), it obscures the real logic of the
decision-theoretic programme.
4.1 The subjective uncertainty argument
Consider Alice, observing a Stern-Gerlach experiment.7 Let us talk in terms
of person-stages. Call the pre-measurement Alice ‘Alice1’. Call the first post-
fission copy of Alice ‘Aliceup2 ’, and call the second post-fission copy of Alice
‘Alicedown2 ’. How should Alice1 view her1 imminent splitting? Should she1 feel
7Or: consider Alice, about to undergo a classical brain-fissioning and transplant operation
that will result in two successors, after which one of the successors will be given a card reading
‘spin-up’ and the other a card reading ‘spin-down’. There is nothing particularly quantum-
mechanical about this argument, other than its urgency.
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as though she1 knows what is going to happen, or should she1 feel that she1
is going to read either ‘up’ or ‘down’ on the dial but that she1 does not know
which?
It has been argued (Saunders (1998)) that despite knowing all of the ob-
jective facts regarding her situation, Alice1 should view regard her1 subjective
situation as one of uncertainty — despite knowing the objective truth that she1
will split into two copies, one of which will observe each possible measurement
result, she1 should expect to become exactly one of those copies, and she1 should
feel uncertain as to which copy she1 will become. In that case, the problem is
solved — decision theory can be applied from the point of view of the pre-
measurement observer on the basis of her subjective uncertainty. I will argue,
however, that the claim of subjective uncertainty should be rejected.
4.1.1 Common ground
My discussion of the (un)certainty issue will draw heavily on some fairly strong
philosophical premises. These, however, form common ground between Saun-
ders, Wallace and myself.
First, we assume a reductionist account of personal identity over time. Sec-
ond, we assume that the mental supervenes (somehow) on the physical. (The
latter does not commit one to any very particular philosophy of mind, but only
requires that if we have a complete physical description of a situation, there are
no remaining undetermined parameters to decide questions of mentality.)
These two assumptions will be crucial to the argument in the following way:
without such philosophical commitments, the way is open to complain that in
saying that before the fission there is one observer, and after the fission there are
two observers each bearing the same causal and structural relations to Alice1
that a person-stage normally bears to her very recent predecessors, we have not
given the full story, since we have not explicitly stated which of the successors
is the same person as Alice1. Given our two assumptions, this need not be
explicitly stated, since it is logically determined by the facts we do explicitly
state.
Further, we agree on the description of this setup in terms of person-stages.
There are three person-stages in the story: Alice1, Alice
up
2 and Alice
down
2 . Alice1
sees a measurement apparatus in its ‘ready’ state. Aliceup2 sees an apparatus
reading ‘up’; Alicedown2 sees an apparatus reading ‘down’. Alice
up
2 and Alice
down
2
each bear the relation of personal-identity-over-time to Alice1, in virtue of the
causal and structural relations that obtain among the person-stages. (Aliceup2
and Alicedown2 do not bear the relation of personal-identity-over-time to one
another — the personal-identity-over-time relation between person-stages, if
conceived as a symmetric relation, is not transitive.)
The disagreement is over how we should connect this description in terms
of person-stages to the issue of Alice1’s (un)certainty.
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4.1.2 The argument for subjective uncertainty (SU)
The SU claim is that a pre-fission agent who believes that her1 future is objec-
tively certain should nevertheless treat an imminent fission event as subjectively
uncertain.
To argue for this claim, Saunders (1998) considers the question of what Alice1
should expect to see, or, who Alice1 should expect to become. (As Saunders notes,
these questions are equivalent, since it is exactly insofar as Alice1 should expect
to become Aliceup2 (Alice
down
2 resp.) that she1 should expect to observe spin-
up (spin-down resp.) — there is no doubt over what Aliceup2 and Alice
down
2
observe.) Saunders considers a list of possibilities that he supposes to be jointly
exhaustive, and argues against each alternative to advocate the SU view by
process of elimination:
(a) she1 should expect nothing — oblivion;
(b) she1 should expect to become both Alice
up
2 and Alice
down
2 ;
(c) she1 should expect to become exactly one of Alice
up
2 , Alice
down
2 , and
should feel uncertain as to which she1 will become.
Saunders dismisses (a) as implausible — double survival cannot constitute
oblivion — and I have no argument with this dismissal. But he then continues:
The genuine alternatives appear to be these: either she1 anticipates
being both [Aliceup2 ] and [Alice
down
2 ], some kind of composite; or
else she1 anticipates being either [Alice
up
2 ] or, in the exclusive sense,
[Alicedown2 ].
Nothing, both, or else just one of them? I have said that the first
option is implausible . . . As for the second option, it is straightfor-
wardly inconsistent with the evidence; [Aliceup2 ] and [Alice
down
2 ] do
not speak in unison; they do not share a single mind; they witness
different events. We do not know what it is to anticipate observ-
ing incompatible outcomes, at a single time. There remains only
the third alternative: [she1] anticipates being one of [Alice
up
2 ] and
[Alicedown2 ], but not both at once. (Saunders (1998), pp.383-4)
So, Alice1 expects to observe either spin-up exclusive-or spin-down, but
doesn’t know which; hence subjective uncertainty.
4.1.3 The argument for subjective certainty (SC)
The SC intuition is that if an observer-stage knows both the relevant aspects
of the objective description of the universe, and his own location within that
universe, there is no room for uncertainty, subjective or otherwise; and, further,
that (due to the determinism of the Everettian quantum dynamics and our
assumption that the pre-fission observer-stage knows the initial state) Everettian
branching meets this condition.
To give expression to this intuition, we need a way of connecting talk about
the future to the basic person-stage account. I assume the following counterpart-
theoretic account of that connection. For properties that we can assign to
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person-stages independently of considerations of personal identity over time,
take as primitive the notion of a person-stage’s having that property (say, the
property of experiencing X). (We have already used this notion — for instance,
when we said that Aliceup2 sees spin-up.) Then it is proper to say that Bob0 will
experience X iff there is some future person-stage that both bears the relation
of personal-identity-over-time to Bob0 and experiences X. We can also talk, as
Saunders does, of one person-stage’s becoming another: it is proper to say of a
given person-stage Bob0 that he will become Bob1 iff Bob1 is a later person-stage
and bears the relation of personal-identity-over-time to Bob0. (This is proposed
as an analysis of locutions such as ‘will see X’ and ‘will become Bob1’.))
Applying these notions to the case of Alice and her spin measurement, we
get the following: the personal-identity-over-time relations among the person-
stages are such that, according to our counterpart-theoretic account of talk
of the future, Alice1 will become Alice
up
2 , and Alice1 will become Alice
down
2 .
Similarly, Alice1 will see spin-up, and Alice1 will see spin-down.
8
What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a
good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So
she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.
What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I
invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)
Saunders will not be convinced by this argument: for him, it misses the
point, by applying the wrong notion of expectation. The crucial point for him
appears contained in the passage quoted above: ‘we do not know what it is to
anticipate observing incompatible outcomes, at a single time.’ That is, when
we’re talking of ‘expectation’ in the sense of anticipation, it is just a conceptual
impossibility for Alice1 to expect to see spin-up, and to expect to see spin-down,
when no person-stage can see both. So he will reject my premise ‘whatever
[Alice1] knows she1 will see, she1 should expect (with certainty) to see.’ The
absurdity (by his lights) of my conclusion just shows (he will say) that we have
a first-person notion of expectation that, in an Everettian situation, violates
this premise. Now, looking for such a notion, we notice that there is a sense
in which (I agree that) Alice1 should expect to observe spin-up or spin-down
but not both: for each of Alice1’s individual successors-at-t2, the statement ‘I
observe spin-up or spin-down but not both’ is true. Perhaps this is the key. One
might further think that Alice1 can feel certain of just those experiences that
all her successors-at-t2 have. Further, one might think that there is a fact of
the matter as to whether or not Alice1 will experience X at t2 iff either all of
8This is not quite the full story. Later (section 4.3), I will argue that in the quantum
case, Aliceup
2
and Alicedown
2
each bear the relation of personal-identity-over-time to Alice1 to
degree less than unity. Thus I say that Alice1 will see spin-up to some degree p < 1, rather
than that she1 will see spin-up simpliciter. This point, however, does not affect the discussion
of uncertainty.
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Alice1’s successors-at-t2 experience X, or none of them do. If that is right, then
in the Everettian scenario under consideration, there is no fact of the matter as
to which outcome Alice1 will see at t2 (although it is a fact that Alice1 will see
some definite outcome at t2); in this way uncertainty over what Alice will see
can be reconciled with knowing all the facts that there are.9
I disagree, in particular, with the claim that Alice1 can feel certain of seeing
X only if all her successors-at-t2 see X. Although I agree that there is a sense
in which Alice1 expects to observe spin-up or spin-down but not both (namely,
the sense outlined in the previous paragraph), I deny that this sense delivers
uncertainty. I say instead: I can feel uncertain over P only if I think that there
is a fact of the matter regarding P of which I am ignorant. (Note that this is a
stronger condition than that it is not the case both that there is a fact of the
matter and that I know that fact; Saunders can accept this latter condition.)
Otherwise I should feel certain — certain that there is no fact of the matter, if
I know that to be the case. (I assume eternalism as far as facts go — that is, I
take it that facts, in whatever sense they exist at all, exist timelessly, regardless
of the spatiotemporal locations of the things in the world with which they are
concerned. So I take it that, under a collapse interpretation of QM, there is
(‘already’) a fact of the matter as to what the outcomes of future quantum
experiments will be, no matter that that fact is unpredictable-in-principle from
the present physical state of the universe; it is this that justifies my feeling
uncertain under such an interpretation.)
Now, if there is no fact of the matter as to whether P holds, that is (invari-
ably, I think!) because enquiring as to whether or not P holds is a bad question
— a question with a false presupposition. For example, in quantum mechanics
there will typically (in the absence of ‘measurement’) be no fact of the matter
as to exactly where an electron is located. But this means that ‘where is the
electron?’ is a bad question, not that we are to be uncertain as to where the
electron is. (Do not assume that the electron has a location; ask instead, ‘what
is its quantum state?’) Similarly, there is no fact of the matter as to what
Alice1’s unique successor-at-t2 will see in a case of Everettian splitting. But if
it is such a fact we ask for when we ask ‘what will Alice see?’, then this means
that our question is a bad one, not that we are (or that Alice1 herself is) to be
uncertain as to what Alice1 will see. (Do not assume that Alice1 has a unique
successor; ask instead, ‘what will each successor-at-t2 see?’)
We could, of course, take an operationalist line on (un)certainty, just as
decision theory does on probability: we could say that to be uncertain as to
whether or not one will observe X just is to assign non-zero importance to each
of the outcomes (observing X, observing not-X) when making decisions. In that
case, it would be near-trivially true that the Everettian ‘feels uncertain’. But
to make this move in defense of the applicability of decision theory would be
viciously circular. If we were convinced in the first place that there was anything
conceptually amiss with applying decision theory to a deterministic branching
situation unless uncertainty can be fitted into that situation, we must have an
9Thanks to Simon Saunders (in conversation) for explaining the points in this paragraph.
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independent notion of uncertainty — independent, that is, of decision theory —
with respect to which we understand our problem. My extra-decision-theoretic
notion of uncertainty requires me to refrain from applying the term to anyone
who thinks there is no relevant fact (objective or otherwise) of which she is
ignorant. I conclude, therefore, that an Everettian facing an imminent quantum
measurement has no right to feel uncertain.
4.2 The Reflection argument
Despite my rejection of subjective uncertainty for the pre-measurement observer,
there is a sense in which subjective uncertainty enters the Everettian picture
— each post -measurement observer, before reading her apparatus, will have the
subjective uncertainty of self-location. She will know that there is one branch
containing an apparatus reading ‘up’ and an observer-stage Aliceup2 , and that
there is one branch containing an apparatus reading ‘down’ and an observer-
stage Alicedown2 , but she will not know which of these two observer-stages she,
understood indexically, is. Nevertheless, in our interpretation, the splitting has
occurred (by decoherence), and she is determinately Aliceup2 or Alice
down
2 .
How should this observer-stage regard her situation? As before, she knows all
the objective facts. But now, there is a subjective fact of which she is ignorant,
namely, her own identity. (That is, she is ignorant of a ‘de se’ fact in the sense
of Lewis (1979).) It seems clear that Aliceup2 and Alice
down
2 should each regard
their situations as ones of subjective uncertainty.
So far, though, we have been discussing a post -fission observer. We have
said nothing about the pre-fission observer, whose rational behaviour we seek
to derive. We cannot invoke an epistemic reflection principle (such as that in-
troduced by van Fraassen (1984)) to argue that the pre-measurement observer
should also be uncertain — the post-measurement uncertainty is self-locating,
and the indexical facts over which Aliceup2 and Alice
down
2 are uncertain are sim-
ply inapplicable to Alice1. But now consider the following decision-theoretic
reflection principle:
If, at time t, I decide rationally to pursue a certain strategy at a later
time t′, and if I gain no new information relevant to that strategy
between times t and t′, then it is rational [i.e. rationally compelling]
not to change my choice of strategy at t′. (Wallace (2002b), p.58)
This principle, I think, is a reasonable one, and it holds the key to the second
line of response to the applicability problem: if we want to apply a decision
theory whose application is justified under uncertainty, we can apply it directly
to the post-fission observer-stages on the basis of their genuine uncertainty, and
appeal to reflection in order to argue that the pre-fission observer-stage should
adopt the same strategy for action.
The Reflection argument achieves its purpose. My main objection to it
is that by my lights, it obscures the real logic of the argument, which latter
is manifest in the fission interpretation. I will elaborate on this point after
presenting the latter approach (section 4.3).
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4.3 The fission interpretation
Parfit (1984) argued that what matters in survival — and therefore, presumably,
what matters in quality of personal future also — is the existence of future
person-stages bearing appropriate relations of structural similarity and causal
connectedness to one’s present person-stage. This dictates that in a case of
fission, I-now must care about each appropriately related successor as one of my
future selves - the rationale being that, whether we’ve realized it or not, this is
in any case all there has ever been to caring about our futures. This being so,
we should be able to develop prescriptions for rational action that altogether
bypass the issue of uncertainty. The task of the present subsection is to argue
that decision theory (with reasonable interpretational adjustments) can do just
that, and that this is the way to understand probability in Everett.
Recall the problem: it seems that without uncertainty, several of the decision-
theoretic axioms are simply inapplicable, and so there must be something seri-
ously conceptually amiss with a proof (such as Deutsch’s) that claims to estab-
lish probability by making essential use of those axioms.
The fission-based solution is as follows: uncertainty is not after all an indis-
pensable prerequisite to the application of decision theory. Rather, the knowl-
edge that one will undergo fission can do all the work conventionally done by
uncertainty over the world’s State. To put it in a way that brings out the anal-
ogy: the knowledge that one will have many actual successors can do the work
conventionally done by the prospect of many possible successors. In either case
our agent must consider the interests of all successors: in the case of uncertainty,
because he cares about his unique future self but does not know which successor
is to be real, and in the case of fission, because all successors are real, and he
cares about them all as his future selves. So we can define an Act as a function
from States of a branch to Consequences, no matter that there is no uncertainty
over whether a branch in that State will exist, or over whether the successor in
that branch is me. Our problem (in the first two paragraphs of section 4) arose
under the assumption that we must treat a future macroscopic superposition of
successors as an atomic entity for decision purposes, that we could not break
it down and require preferences to recognize certain salient features of the su-
perpositions (such as that a certain component of the superposition represents
a successor of amplitude ai enjoying a Consequence Ci). If that were the case,
then indeed, we could constrain the agent’s preferences only by requiring an
ordering on the space of all possible future superpositions, and no nontrivial
probability could arise. But the assumption is unjustified.
Let us see what work decision theory will be doing in such a fission context.
The Parfitian account of caring for the future tells me to care about all my
successors. What it doesn’t tell me, at least not directly, is how to weigh the
interests of my successors one against another, or how to choose between Acts
that would generate different numbers of successors. This will be crucial in
determining my rational actions. Suppose (somewhat artificially) that I am
confronted with the choice of whether or not to sign a particular form. After
I make my choice, a Stern-Gerlach experiment will be carried out. If I signed,
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my spin-up successor will be force-fed olives, and my spin-down successor will
be given chocolate. If I didn’t sign, no-one is fed. But I hate olives. How
do I decide whether having one successor worse off and another better off is
preferable to having all my successors stuck with the status quo? Do I sign or
not?
Lewis (1976) introduces the term ‘R-relation’ to represent the thing he con-
siders matters in survival: mental continuity and connectedness. As Lewis rec-
ognizes, the holding of the R-relation between given person-stages is a matter
of degree: for any two given person-stages, he suggests, a real number r ∈ [0, 1]
represents their degree of R-relatedness. Ordinary personal identity over an
infinitesimal time interval involves person-stages R-related to degree 1, while
person-stages of entirely disjoint continuant persons are R-related to degree 0;
cases of fading memory, fission and fusion, brainwashing, brain transplant and
so on may take intermediate values.
I agree that the R-relation — mental continuity and connectedness — cap-
tures much of what matters in survival. But I do not wish to beg the question
by assuming that this is all that matters; indeed, I will argue that given the Ev-
erett interpretation and Deutsch’s axioms, it is not all that matters. I therefore
introduce the term ‘R*-relation’, initially as a place-holder, to denote whatever
it is that matters in survival and in caring for the future.
The question is to what extent the R*-relation holds between myself and
each of my Everettian successors. It is here that decision theory claims to help.
Where, classically, decision theory invokes a notion of Chance Setups (recall:
‘situations in which a number of possible events might occur, and . . . it is in
general impossible for the agent to predict with certainty which will occur’), we
can invoke Fission Setups (situations in which the agent will undergo fission,
and a number of distinct successors will be correlated with qualitatively distinct
events). Where classical decision theory construes Acts as ‘possible courses of
action for the individual (usually in the face of uncertainty as to which outcome
is going to occur)’, and the set S of States as the locus of uncertainty, we
can construe Acts as possible courses of action for the individual, usually in
the face of knowledge that the individual will have multiple successors, each in
general correlated with qualitatively different States (and hence Consequences).
No formal adaptation, and no further interpretational adaptation is required
— Deutsch’s and Wallace’s decision-theoretic axioms can be applied as well,
and as reasonably, under a fission-based interpretation of the decision structure
as under its uncertainty-based analogue. The Deutsch-Wallace proof is to be
understood as claiming to establish that my Everettian successors bear the R*-
relation to me-now in proportion to their amplitude-squared measures. With
this conceptual base, decision theory can be applied without uncertainty.
We would then have precisely what I have argued (section 2) is needed to
solve the probability problem in Everett: a rationality principle that tells us how
to act in the face of the Everettian world-picture, and that (arguably) instructs
us to regard Everett as empirically confirmed.
I can now say why, in my view, the Reflection approach obscures the logic
of Everettian decisions. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that, in the above
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scenario, the relevant outcomes (chocolate, hunger, olives) are equally spaced
in terms of utility. Then if I strictly prefer signing the form to not signing it
(perhaps in a fission setup in which the spin-down successor has higher quantum-
mechanical weight), that is so because I care more about my spin-down successor
than I do about my spin-up successor. It is not because my post-fission selves
will suffer weighted disorientation, although (as emphasized by the Reflection
argument) that is also true.
5 Problem: justification of measurement neu-
trality (MN)
5.1 Measurement neutrality
My discussion up to now has been conditional — if we accept the decision-
theoretic axioms, Physicality (P) and Measurement Neutrality (MN), and the
applicability of decision theory to deterministic fission, then the desired result
follows.10 I have argued (section 4.3) in defense of the decision-theoretic axioms,
and I regard Physicality as obviously correct. This leaves one question, whose
answer will determine whether we are to regard the Deutsch-Wallace theorem as
a genuine proof of the Born rule, or as an interesting conditional with a dubious
antecedent: is the assumption of Measurement Neutrality justified?
Measurement Neutrality, recall (from section 3.2), is the assumption that a
rational agent should be indifferent between any two quantum games that agree
on the state |ψ〉 to be measured, measurement operator Xˆ and payoff function P ,
regardless of how Xˆ is measured on |ψ〉. It is this assumption that justifies the
abstraction from physical detail involved in Deutsch’s and Wallace’s notation
(i.e. the representation of quantum games (Acts) by triples 〈|ψ〉, Xˆ,P〉, rather
than by quadruples 〈|ψ〉, Xˆ,P , ω〉, where ω would represent additional detail
of the physics): according to MN, a rational agent will always be indifferent
between two quadruples 〈|ψ〉, Xˆ,P , ω〉 and 〈|ψ〉, Xˆ,P , ω′〉, and so we need not
distinguish the two.
At first sight, this assumption seems so obviously correct as hardly to be
worth a second glance (‘who cares exactly how a measurement device works,
provided that it works?’). As Wallace (2003b, pp.21-2) points out, however,
this is not the case. To see why, we can consider the conflict between Mea-
surement Neutrality and a Born-violating rationality strategy that I will call
‘Egalitarianism’; this is the task of the next section.
10It does follow: the proof, once Deutsch’s tacit assumptions have been made explicit
as Wallace urges, is valid. Further, Deutsch’s tacit assumptions are not themselves directly
probabilistic in nature, so we need not take them to undermine the motivation for the decision-
theoretic project. See Wallace (2003a) for a reply to the contrary claim made by Barnum,
Caves, Finkelstein, Fuchs and Schack (2000): the point is that we are to understand Deutsch’s
proof as applying to the Everett interpretation, in which measurement is treated as a quantum-
mechanical process, rather than taken as primitive.
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5.2 Measurement Neutrality versus Egalitarianism
Historically, when it has been supposed that probability can make sense at all
in the Everett interpretation, it has often been asserted (e.g. Graham 1973,
p.236) that, for an Everettian, each branch must receive equal probability —
after all, each branch is equally real. When (as now) probability is to be under-
stood in terms of rational caring, a similar point can be pressed: since all my
successors are equally real, surely I should care for each to an equal degree? Let
‘Egalitarianism’ denote the view that indeed, I should care equally for each.
To see just how non-trivial MN is, consider how it parts company from such
Egalitarianism in the following case (which is, in fact, integral to Deutsch’s
proof). One way to measure an observable Xˆ on a system A in a state of
superposition |ψ〉A = a1|x1〉A + a2|x2〉A is first to couple that system to an
auxiliary system B, on which an observable Yˆ with eigenspectrum |yi〉, i ∈
{1, ..., N} is defined, in such a way as to generate the following entangled state:
|ψ〉AB = a1√
n
|x1〉A(|y1〉B+. . .+|yn〉B)+ a2√
N − n |x2〉A(|yn+1〉B+. . .+|yN〉B) (5)
We can then measure Xˆ on A by measuring Yˆ on B, and counting the
observation of any y ∈ {y1, . . . , yn} on B as an observation of eigenvalue x1 on
A, and any y ∈ {yn+1, . . . , yN} on B as an observation of eigenvalue x2 on A.
But a second way to measure Xˆ on A, of course, is to dispense with the auxiliary
system altogether and make the measurement of interest directly.
How should the rational agent, who (say) has already accepted a deal under
which the eigenvalue x1 of Xˆ is to be correlated to some Consequence c1 and
x2 to a Consequence c2 — so, he has already accepted the |ψ〉, Xˆ and P that
for Deutsch and Wallace constitute the full specification (for decision purposes)
of a quantum game — feel about a choice between these two ways of measuring
Xˆ? Measurement Neutrality requires him to be indifferent. But, on the picture
entertained by the Egalitarian, all is far from the same — the branching struc-
tures associated with the two measurements are very different. On that picture,
for example, a direct measurement of Xˆ on A will result in two branches, one
realizing x1 and the other realizing x2, whereas the above measurement of Xˆ
on A via coupling to B will result in N branches, in n of which x1 is realized,
in (N − n) of which x2 is realized. In general, then, an agent who cares about
how many successors he has, or about what proportion (by simple counts) of
his successors receive each Consequence, will not be indifferent, therefore such
an agent will violate MN. And these do not (at first sight) seem unreasonable
things for an Everettian to care about; MN does not only require indifference
between measuring devices with some concealed component painted blue and
otherwise identical devices in which the component is painted red.11
11It may be possible to give MN a far stronger intuitive justification from an SU, rather
than a fission-based, perspective. (See Wallace (2003c; 2003b, p.22) for some argument in this
direction.) If so, that may give a reason (for an Everettian!) to wish SU true. But a reason
to wish SU true is not a reason to believe it true; I have argued (section 4.1) that it is false.
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At what point in Deutsch’s proof should an agent who cares about the
branching structure in this way feel that injustice is being done? Technically, of
course, the proof cannot even get off the ground without Measurement Neutral-
ity: as mentioned above, MN is built in right from the start, being incorporated
into Deutsch’s notation. But heuristically, it would be nice to identify the pre-
cise point at which the disagreement really sets in: Deutsch’s equations (2.10)
and (3.1) (Stages 1 and 2 in Wallace’s reconstruction of Deutsch’s proof) —
equiprobability in case of equal amplitudes — are unobjectionable to our Egal-
itarian. Not so Deutsch’s equation (3.5) (Stage 3 in Wallace’s reconstruction),
which claims that the agent is constrained to assign amplitude-squared prob-
abilities to (certain cases of) unequal amplitudes: our agent wants to assign
equal probabilities to each of his successors, regardless of amplitude. Unsurpris-
ingly, it turns out that Measurement Neutrality plays a crucial role in deriving
Deutsch’s (3.5). Deutsch’s strategy is to argue that:
• It has already been proved that, if we accept the axioms listed above, we
must assign equal probabilities in case of equal amplitudes.
• Therefore, in the scenario described above, we must assign equal proba-
bilities to each branch that corresponds to a distinct result for the mea-
surement of Yˆ on system B.
• But the same physical procedure can be regarded as a measurement of Xˆ
on system A: we can count the observation of any y ∈ {y1, . . . , yn} on B
as an observation of eigenvalue x1 on A, and any y ∈ {yn+1, . . . , yN} on
B as an observation of eigenvalue x2 on A.
• Therefore, when the measurement of Xˆ is conducted in this way, we must
assign unequal probabilities (with particular values) to the possible results
for Xˆ .
• By Measurement Neutrality, we must assign those same unequal proba-
bilities to the possible results for Xˆ when Xˆ is measured in any other way
(including methods in which the auxiliary system is dispensed with and
the measurement is made directly).
Our Egalitarian should object at the last step of this argument: he should
say that, for sure, if Xˆ is to be measured in such a way that the numbers of
branches corresponding to the results x1, x2 are in the ratio
|a1|2
|a2|2 , then he will
assign probabilities |a1|2, |a2|2 to x1, x2 respectively, but that if Xˆ is measured in
a way that generates one branch for each of x1, x2, then he will assign probability
1
2
to each. Neither will he be impressed by any foot-stamping insistence that he
is unreasonable to care about how his observable is measured: as I have argued,
such insistence merely begs the question against his view.12
12A similar point applies to Wallace’s proof from Savage-style decision axioms: the Egalitar-
ian will object to the use of Measurement Neutrality in proving Wallace’s General Equivalence
Theorem (Wallace (2002b, p.34-5/2003b, p.7-10)).
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5.3 Egalitarianism is incoherent
Egalitarianism is not, in fact, a tenable position. The reason is that it relies on
an over-idealized conception of Everettian branching: it relies on the assumption
that the ‘number of branches’ associated with a given outcome is well-defined.
This assumption is common enough — it underwrites the most natural turns of
phrase for discussing Everettian branching, which latter I have used throughout
this paper — and, if used with caution, harmless enough. But it is not generally
true, and here the failure to keep that in mind is taking its toll.
Why is the number of branches associated with a given outcome not well-
defined? The point is that we are assuming a decoherence-based conception
of ‘branching’, not a primitivist conception. Under any such conception, the
‘number of branches’ at a given time could only be the number of elements of
the decoherence-preferred basis that appear in the universal state with nonzero
coefficient at that time. But, in the first instance, the decoherence basis is only
approximately defined by the dynamics; decomposing the universal state into
branches by projections onto a slightly rotated basis can wildly affect the num-
ber (although not the total weight) of branches enjoying a given Consequence.
Second, there is ambiguity over just how coarse-grained the division of the mul-
tiverse into distinct branches is to be: too fine-grained a division will fail to
retain the freedom from inter-branch interference that played a crucial role in
selecting the preferred basis in the first place; too coarse-grained a division will
lead to loss of macroscopic definiteness; we must choose some compromise, but
who is to say exactly what degree of coarse-graining we should settle on? Again,
our exact choice can dramatically affect relative numbers of successors enjoying
each Consequence, but it is an arbitrary choice, and there is no deep fact of
the matter. Without abandoning the whole philosophy behind the decoherence
approach — which would be a desperate expedient — there is no way to fix one
exact basis, or degree of coarse-graining, as ‘preferred’ for purposes of rational
decision. Third, even if (per impossibile) these problem could be solved, branch-
ing will in general be continuous — for instance, many of the interactions that
lead to branching involve monitoring a system’s position, and position is a con-
tinuous variable. We cannot, therefore, properly talk of ‘how many successors’
see spin-up, and Egalitarianism fails.13
5.4 The status of the Everettian Born rule without uncer-
tainty
There is a spectrum of possible positions for an Everettian who accepts the
Born rule. At one extreme, she could claim that a compelling argument forces
any rational agent to accept the Born rule, on pain of denying some obviously
true premise. At the other extreme (primitivism), she could simply stipulate
that rational agents are to accept the Born rule. Or she could take an interme-
diate position: she could go beyond mere stipulation to offer some supporting
13Wallace (2003c), section 8, provides a more extended presentation and defense of this
important point.
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arguments that, however, fall short of absolute compulsion.
In this section, I want to make three claims. (i) (Section 5.4.1) Primitivism
is, indeed, plausible. This provides the Everettian with, at the very least, a
‘fall-back’ position — while she may hope for more substantial justification
for the Born rule, she need not fear that without such additional justification,
her interpretation is sunk. (ii) (Section 5.4.2) We can do somewhat better
than primitivism, by noting that it turns out to be extremely difficult to find
any plausible rationality strategy that violates the Born rule. (iii) (Section
5.4.3) Because of a lack of justification for Measurement Neutrality, the Deutsch-
Wallace decision-theoretic proof does not (under the present interpretation) play
the persuasive role its originators hoped for: we cannot do all that much better
than primitivism.
5.4.1 Primitivism is not so bad
Ceteris paribus, the existence of a compelling argument to force the Born rule
would improve the Everettian position. A philosophical position is always im-
proved if a principle it formerly accepted as primitive can be shown to follow
from other accepted primitives, or from the otherwise obviously true. But this
does not have to mean that the absence of a compelling argument should lead us
to abandon the idea that the Born rule governs Everettian rationality — prim-
itivism may suffice. (This point has been pressed, in particular, by Papineau
(1996), who points out that insisting on a compelling argument for Everettian
probability would be invoking double standards — what argument forces us, for
instance, to consider propensities as relevant to rationality?)
The primitivist suggestion amounts to this: if we have to accept the con-
clusion of the quantum representation theorem (as the Fission interpreter un-
derstands it) as primitive, viz. that a rational Everettian is to care about her
successors in proportion to their amplitude-squared measures, this is not, in any
case, so bad.14
I make this point by means of an analogy with another dilemma that, I take
it, we have (or, at least, the Everettian has) already learnt to live with: the
potential for a reductionist account of personal identity over time to undermine
self-interest. This analogy is set out in the following table.
14Similar suggestions — specifically, that the quantitative problem of probability in Everett
can be solved by fiat, by simply stipulating that the amplitude-squared measure is to be
interpreted as ‘probability’ — have been made before. But without the link to rationality, it
is just not clear what such suggestions could possiblymean in an Everettian picture. Accepting
some suggestion as primitive is one thing; accepting as primitive a suggestion that has no clear
meaning is quite another.
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Self-interest and reductionism Rationality and Everett
Under a primitivist conception of
personal identity over time (PIOT),
I (selfishly) care about my future self
because it’s me. This seems intu-
itively acceptable enough.
Under (say) a primitivist conception
of probability, I am more concerned
to maximize the utility that’s corre-
lated with high-probability outcomes
because they’re more likely to be real.
This (perhaps!) seems intuitively ac-
ceptable enough.
Under a reductionist account of
PIOT, this becomes: I am to (self-
ishly) care about future person-
stages that bear certain structural
and causal relations to me-now.
Under an Everettian picture, this
becomes: I am more concerned to
maximize my utility in high-weight
worlds.
Self-interest and reductionism Rationality and Everett
This invites the challenge: what
makes these particular relations rel-
evant to self-interest?
This invites the challenge: what
makes amplitudes relevant to ratio-
nality?
Answer: that’s just what self-interest
is (whether or not we’ve realized it).
Answer: that’s just what rationality
is (whether or not we’ve realized it).
The challenge may be pressed: why
is ‘self-interest’ in this sense prescrip-
tively compelling?
The challenge may be pressed: why
is ‘rationality’ in this sense prescrip-
tively compelling?
This question seems to have no an-
swer other than an evolutionary one:
person-stages that failed to look out
for ‘their’ futures in this way died
out, and so don’t have any present
structural counterparts.
This question seems to have no
answer other than an evolutionary
one: person-stages that failed to
prioritize their future high-weight
structural counterparts don’t have
present structural counterparts in
high-weight branches.
It’s perfectly consistent for a person-
stage to refuse to care about future
structural counterparts: sure, he will
tend to die out, but he doesn’t care.
It’s perfectly consistent for a person-
stage to refuse to care about weight:
sure, he will tend to die out in high-
weight branches, but he doesn’t care.
However, the self-consistency of such
lack of care doesn’t undermine the
prescriptive force of acting ‘self-
interestedly’ in this sense.
However, the self-consistency of such
lack of preferential care doesn’t un-
dermine the prescriptive force of act-
ing ‘rationally’ in this sense.
The suggestion, then, is that the rational Everettian just should care about
her successors in proportion to their amplitude-squared measures. How can
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we talk, to bring out the reasonableness of this suggestion? We had better
not say that the higher-weight branches contain more copies of us — as noted
above (section 5.3), the number of branches is not defined. But since we have
a measure over our successors, we can, if we find it intuitive, talk of ‘how
much successor’ sees spin-up. I have a preference for my spin-down successor
to receive chocolate, rather than my spin-up successor, because there is more of
the former; more of my future lies that way. Thus, I think, Lockwood’s (1996)
talk of a ‘superpositional dimension’, and/or Vaidman’s (1998, 2001) suggestion
that we speak of the amplitude-squared measure as a ‘measure of existence’, are
somewhat appropriate (although we are not to regard lower-weight successors
as less real, for being real is an all-or-nothing affair — we should say instead
that there is less of them).
However that may be, any reader who dislikes such talk is welcome to stick
with the following. There is some relation — I have (section 4.3) called it the
R*-relation — that my successors/classes of successor(s)/etc. bear to me to
varying degrees according to their amplitude-squared measures. That relation
can be taken as holding between branch-stages (i.e. world-stages) rather than
person-stages, if we want to avoid an apparent emphasis on self-interest. We
may think, as I urge in the above table, that that relation governs rational care-
for-the-future in the manner given by the Born rule; if so, no more needs to be
said.
5.4.2 Improving on primitivism: the absence of sensible alternatives
to the Born rule
The failure of Egalitarianism (section 5.2) raises an important question: are
there any coherent rationality strategies that are at all plausible and that also
violate the Born rule? If not, we may hope to go beyond primitivism, and to
defend the Born rule by sheer process of elimination.
It’s certainly true that MN-violating strategies that guide an agent’s actions
other than in an ad hoc manner, while remaining faithful to Physicality, are
extremely difficult to come by — far more difficult than one would initially
suspect. Suggestions that probabilities could be set equal to squared branch
weights (renormalized), for instance, likewise fall foul of the requirement that
advice for rational action should be unaffected by slight rotations of the preferred
basis or alterations of the degree of coarse-graining, and of the failure of the
branching structure to be discrete. Suggestions that eigenvalues, for instance,
might be relevant to probabilities, fall foul of Physicality even without invoking
the approximate nature of the preferred basis: the eigenvalue attached to a given
measurement outcome is an artefact of our description, and is not determined
by the physics. Barnum et al (2000) complain that Deutsch’s stated axioms
fail to outlaw probability prescriptions such as ‘the result associated with |φ〉
always occurs’; whereas Barnum et al take this to illustrate that Deutsch needs a
‘hidden probabilistic assumption’ (emphasis added), the suggested rule actually
violates Physicality (Wallace (2003b), section 6). It does seem that the only
way we can come up with an MN-violating strategy is by brute force: that is,
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by specifying a preference ordering over Acts on a case-by-case basis, without
appeal to any general governing rationale.
What’s wrong with that? Perhaps, we might think, nothing — after all, an
arbitrary preference ordering over possible states of the multiverse would provide
a guide to rational action that is at least self-consistent and well-defined ; there
is no violation of Physicality here. It will not in general be a preference ordering
that we can regard as intuitively compelling, but no matter: after all, classical
decision theory allows the ‘rational’ agent total freedom to hold a preference
ordering that most of us would consider bizarre.15 If we are to rule out such
arbitrary preference orderings, it must be on grounds stronger than mere self-
consistency and Physicality.
However, I think that imposing such stronger grounds is legitimate. Accord-
ing to my argument of section 4.3, the correct classical analog of this arbitrary
preference ordering over wavefunctions of the multiverse is an arbitrary pref-
erence ordering over Chance Setups, not over Consequences. Any such order-
ing would be perfectly self-consistent — but, in general, it would violate the
decision-theoretic axioms. Even in the classical case, therefore, we are in the
habit of imposing rationality requirements stronger than consistency, and we
regard that practice as acceptable just in case the axioms themselves seem intu-
itive enough, and lead to intuitively acceptable enough prescriptions for action.
The imposition of the Born probability measure is just such a move.
5.4.3 Taking stock: The role of decision theory in a defense of the
Everett interpretation
Where does all this leave the decision-theoretic programme?
Deutsch and Wallace claimed to be offering a compelling argument — viz.,
the decision-theoretic proof — that would force any rational agent to accept the
Born rule, on pain of rejecting some supposedly undeniable premises. Given the
interpretation urged in this paper, I think this is not quite the right perspec-
tive on the proof. According to the Everett interpretation, ‘measurement’ is
just another physical process; it is therefore extremely hard to see directly why
equivalence qua measurement should force equivalence qua chance setup. (It is
important here to note that Egalitarianism failed due to its own incoherence,
not due to any compelling nature of MN.) In particular, if some rationality
strategy could be found that seemed otherwise intuitively compelling, to in-
voke Measurement Neutrality against that strategy would be merely to beg the
question.
Rather, I think the correct perspective is the following. The Everettian Born
rule is fairly compelling once we see (a) that the competing genuine intuition
(Egalitarianism) is incoherent, and (b) that it is actually extremely difficult to
cook up an alternative rationality strategy that respects Physicality and is also
systematic. Perhaps combined with a hint of primitivism, these considerations
should lead us to accept that, in an Everettian world, the preferences of ratio-
15This point is due to Adam Elga (in conversation).
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nal agents over quantum Acts would be such that they can be represented by a
utility function over Consequences and the Born probability measure over mea-
surement outcomes. The Born rule, of course, implies Measurement Neutrality,
so this should lead us to accept the latter. (So my point is not that MN is false
— I think it is true. My point is that MN is unacceptable as a primitive.)
We might think that, if this is right, the decision-theoretic program is simply
left out in the cold: after all, if we are content to accept the Born rationality
strategy as more-or-less primitive, what use do we have for a proof that it follows
from a principle (MN) that we don’t accept as primitive? This, though, would
be a little too negative.
First, decision theory (as in the classical case, and quite apart from the
Deutsch-Wallace theorem) provides an appropriate and highly illuminating struc-
ture for discussions of probability, demonstrates the existence of a probability
measure or ‘caring measure’ over future branches, and makes it clear what is
meant by that measure, by connecting that measure to a preference ordering
over Acts.
Second, having accepted the Born rule and seen that it implies Measure-
ment Neutrality, we can (if we wish) run the Deutsch-Wallace proof to see
that Measurement Neutrality (together with thoroughly reasonable decision-
theoretic axioms and the uncontentious Physicality) in turn implies the Born
rule; the Deutsch-Wallace proof then serves as an illustration of the internal
coherence of the recommended Everettian position on probability.
Third, we may hope to do better. It may be possible to find an intuitive
justification for an intermediate primitive — stronger than MN, but weaker than
the full Born rule — and thence to recover the full importance of the decision-
theoretic proof as a persuasive argument for the Everettian Born rule. Wallace
(2003c, section 8) suggests one such intermediate primitive (‘Equivalence’): it
suffices if we assume (in addition to Physicality and decision theory) that the
agent assigns the same probability to any two Consequences that have the same
quantum-mechanical weight. I have not embraced this path, because I find it
hard to see how this assumption can be intuitively justified other than by relying
on the intuitive plausibility of the Born rule itself. But perhaps there is a way.
6 Conclusions
The problem of probability in Everett is often formulated as a twofold challenge:
an incoherence problem (how can probability make sense, if all outcomes are
realized?) and a quantitative problem (assuming probability makes sense at
all, why the particular probabilities prescribed by the Born rule?). Under the
present approach, the incoherence problem in particular is transformed. We note
first that merely verbal disagreements need not detain us: I have argued (section
2) that the Everettian has no need to claim title to the term ‘probability’, over
and above her needs (a) to formulate a strategy for rational action in the face
of branching, and (b) to be entitled to regard quantum mechanics, given the
sequences of experimental outcomes we have in fact observed, as empirically
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confirmed. If it can be shown that a certain rationality principle holds (viz.
that the preferences of rational agents over quantum games are represented by
an expected utility rule that uses the Born probability measure), this will meet
(a) and, I have suggested (section 2.3), there is reason to hope that it may also
meet (b). If that is right, then the problem of probability in Everett reduces to
the problem of how to justify the requisite rationality principle.16
The decision-theoretic approach attempts to meet precisely that challenge:
to provide a rigorous argument to force the Everettian Born rule as a ratio-
nality principle. This approach, however, requires us (in the first instance) to
apply decision theory to Everettian branching, with decision-theoretic Conse-
quences assigned to individual branches (rather than simply to states of the
multiverse). We may well ask why this is reasonable: here, Wallace (2002b,
2003b) has advocated an appeal to subjective uncertainty. I have rejected this
appeal to uncertainty (section 4.1), but I have proposed and defended an alter-
native (section 4.3): the Everettian is to care about each of her multiple futures
in the same way (and for the same reasons) that anyone might care for a unique
future, and this licenses application of analogs of the usual decision-theoretic
axioms to quantum branching in the required way— uncertainty is not required.
Deutsch and Wallace also need to place two further restrictions on the ‘ra-
tional’ agent’s preferences over quantum games: Physicality and Measurement
Neutrality. Their proofs then establish that if an agent’s preferences over quan-
tum games satisfy all of these constraints, then not only do his preferences (as
in classical applications of decision theory) define a unique probability function,
but (a restriction that has no classical analog) the probability function is re-
quired to be that of the Born rule. On the interpretation advocated in this
paper, this amounts to establishing that such an agent ‘cares about’ the fu-
ture branches in proportion to their amplitude-squared measures. (This means,
among other things, that the amplitude-squared measure of a branch acts as
a rational betting quotient, and (given an appropriate a priori link between
rational belief and rational action) satisfies Lewis’ Principal Principle.)
The proof is valid; whether we regard it as establishing its conclusion de-
pends on whether we are antecedently more inclined to accept the premises
16The following objection is sometimes raised against the decision-theoretic approach: in
an Everettian context, all outcomes of a decision are realized, and therefore it simply does not
make sense to make choices, or to reason about how one should act. If that is correct, then
while we may agree that probability can in principle be derived from rationality, this is of no
use to the Everettian, since (it is claimed) the Everettian cannot make sense of rationality
itself.
If this was correct, it would be a pressing ‘incoherence problem’ for the decision-theoretic
approach. The objection, however, is simply mistaken. The mistake arises from an assumption
that decisions must be modelled as Everettian branching, with each possible outcome of the
decision realized on some branch. This is not true, and it is not at all what is going on in the
decision scenarios Deutsch and Wallace consider. Rather, the agent is making a genuine choice
between quantum games, only one of which will be realized (namely, the chosen game). To
be sure, each game consists of an array of branches, all of which will, if that game is chosen,
be realized. But this does not mean that all games will be realized. It is no less coherent for
an Everettian to have a preference ordering over quantum games than it is for an agent in a
state of classical uncertainty to have a preference ordering over classical lotteries.
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than the conclusion itself. So: are we? As mentioned above, I have argued that
the decision-theoretic axioms are perfectly acceptable, although the Everettian
should justify them in the non-standard way sketched in section 4.3. I regard
Physicality as an obvious truth. Measurement Neutrality (MN), however, is the
weak point of the proof: given the Everettian account of measurement, it is
hard to see why one should accept MN as a primitive rationality constraint.
I have suggested that we should accept the Born rule itself as something of
a primitive; this suggestion is supported by the observation that there are no
remotely plausible alternatives on offer. This approach has more modest am-
bitions than Deutsch’s original project, but it, almost as well as Deutsch’s and
Wallace’s approach, promises to solve the problems of probability in Everett.
The Everett interpretation gives us coefficients that physically govern interfer-
ence effects; we should accept that interpretation, if the link between rational
action and theory confirmation conjectured in section 2.3 obtains, because we
also take those coefficients to appropriately govern rational action. Whether or
not that crucial condition is met, however, remains an open question.
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